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THE STATUS OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 
AFTER BOWSHER v. SYNAR 
PAUL R. VERKUIL* 
The concept of a multimember, bipartisan, expert tribunal free from 
direct control by the legislative and executive branches of government 
was an appealing premise of the New Deal administrative state.1 The 
independent agency was thought to embody this concept. The label "in-
dependent," while aptly describing the function of these agencies, at the 
same time raised difficult and so far unresolved constitutional questions 
about their place in our tripartite system of government.2 
Over the years, the growth of executive departments and executive 
branch agencies and the advent of deregulation have diminished the role 
and stature of independent agencies. 3 But no administration prior to the 
present one directly attacked the concept of agency independence from 
the constitutional perspective. The Reagan administration has ques-
tioned the constitutional legitimacy of administrators who perform exec-
utive functions independent of executive controJ.4 Now that the issue 
has been raised, it is easy to predict a series of judicial challenges to the 
• President and Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. 
1. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMlNlSTRATlVE PROCESS 15-46 (1938). Much of what might be 
called traditional administrative law, including the ordering principles contained in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982), has been developed to strengthen 
the independent agency structure. The formal adjudication provisions of the APA, for example, are 
designed for use by independent agencies. See id. §§ 554-557. The hearing examiner (now adminis-
trative law judge) was originally associated with the independent agency. See Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 35-36 n.l (1950) (explaining terms and conditions of hearing examiners' 
employment by administrative agencies). 
2. Contemporary New Deal critics of independent agencies labeled them a headless fourth 
branch of government. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMllTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, 
REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT 39-42 (1937). This characterization has persisted over the years. See, e.g., 
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216, 1219 (1983) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
3. Indeed, in addition to reducing the significance of the economic regulatory agencies, dereg-
ulation claimed an independent agency as its first victim: The Civil Aeronautics Board, a New Deal 
favorite, went out of business in 1985. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551 (1982); see also Note, Incorporation 
of Independellt Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985). 
4. See Taylor, A Question of Power. a Powerful Questioner, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at B6, 
col. 3 (noting Attorney General Meese's comments "that the entire system of independent agencies 
may be unconstitutional"); see also Fein, Get Rid of Regulatory Ageucies. They Aren•t Independent 
and They're Unconstitutional, Wash. Post, July 27, 1986, at D5, col. 4 (arguing that congressional 
endowment of independent agencies with executive authority violates separation-of-powers 
principles). 
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independent agency.5 
This kind of litigation will likely be encouraged now that the 
Supreme Court has declared the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation 
constitutionally defective because it assigned executive functions to an 
official-the Comptroller General-who was controlled by the Congress 
but was independent of the executive. 6 Although Bowsher v. Synar did 
not directly rule on the validity of independent agencies, it sheds impor-
tant light on that question. Moreover, because Congress must now 
restructure the Comptroller General's relationship to the Deficit Control 
Act, the question whether Congress might reconstitute the Comptroller 
General's position along traditional independent agency lines is of con-
siderable practical importance. For these reasons, no contemporary pub-
lic law issue is more intriguing than the legitimacy and continued vitality 
of the independent agency. 
Part I of this article explores the historical underpinnings of the de-
bate over the constitutionality of independent agencies, with emphasis on 
the relationship between the appointment power and the removal power. 
Part II examines in detail the holding and implications of Bowsher v. 
Synar. Part III discusses the likely future of the independent agency in 
light of Bowsher, and concludes that Bowsher need not signal the death of 
that form of administrative organization. The article then suggests possi-
ble ways in which Congress could revise the Comptroller General's role 
under the Deficit Reduction Act so as to surmount the constitutional 
hurdles that Bowsher erected. 
I. THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY DEBATE 
The independent agency has existed for one hundred years, since the 
formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission as the prototype. 7 
But its "independence" did not become a matter of constitutional con-
cern until the 1930's, when the New Deal greatly expanded the number 
of agencies and commissions. Ironically, President Roosevelt, the great 
spawner of administrative government, was the victim as well as the ben-
eficiary of the independence concept. More ironically, we now find the 
repudiator of the New Deal, Ronald Reagan, seeking to vindicate the 
5. See i11jra notes 52-66 and accompanying text. 
6. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). 
7. Ironically, the ICC began life in 1887 as an executive agency within the Department of the 
Interior. It became "independent" in 1889. See R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT RI!GULATORY 
COMMISSIONS 60-62, 67 (1941). See ge11era/ly R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUJJ., ADMINISTRA· 
TIVE LAw AND PROCESS§ 4.4.1a, at 98-100 (1985) (discussing alternative reasons why certain agen-
cies are established as "independent"). 
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same principles of executive control over the agencies that Roosevelt un-
successfully expounded some fifty years earlier. 
Commissions usually consist of five or seven members, who are ap-
pointed on a bipartisan basis and serve for a term usually exceeding that 
of the President. 8 The critical guaranty of independence, however, is the 
statutory protection that commissioners enjoy against presidential re-
moval; typically, they can be removed only "for cause."9 Working from 
this premise of political independence, Congress, during the Roosevelt 
administration, gave the "alphabet" agencies broad powers to regulate 
business activity and behavior. Roosevelt appointed to agency positions 
aggressive reformers who shared his view of active government such as 
James Landis and William 0. Douglas. The notion that officials ap-
pointed by the President but insulated from executive control could com-
mence, hear, and decide (subject to judicial review) cases of major 
importance to the private sector came to be accepted as a necessary orga-
nizational tenet of modern government.I0 
The Supreme Court accepted the structure of independent agencies 
even as it rejected the major economic initiatives of President Roosevelt's 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Indeed, in Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor v. United States, II the Court endorsed the independent agency 
with a vengeance by rebuffing an effort by Roosevelt to remove an unco-
operative commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. The Presi-
dent had dismissed Humphrey before Humphrey's term expired without 
ascribing the statutorily mandated cause. The President apparently as-
sumed that precedent rendered such statutory restrictions upon his re-
moval authority unconstitutional.I2 
Since the day it was decided, Humphrey's Executor has shaped the 
judicial understanding of the independence concept in administrative 
8. Terms vary from agency to agency. For example, Nuclear Regulatory Commission mem-
bers serve five years, see 42 U.S.C. § 5841(c) (1982), Federal Communications Commission members 
serve seven years, see 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (1982), and Federal Reserve Board members serve fourteen 
years. See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1982). See also SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FED-
ERAL REGULATION VOL. V-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION, S. Doc. No. 91, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
35 n.50 (1977) (noting varying terms for members of different federal agencies). 
9. The usual formulation is "[a]ny Commissioner may be removed by the President for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982) (authorizing removal of FTC 
members). 
10. See generally M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
(1955). 
11. 295 u.s. 602 (1935). 
12. Id. at 616. President Roosevelt believed that his position was vindicated by Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). 
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law. 13 Some insulation from direct control by the President was thought 
desirable for those agencies that exercised powers labeled "quasi-judi-
cial" or "quasi-legislative."14 If a president could remove these officials 
without giving a reason, he could presumably remove them for politically 
motivated reasons, thereby jeopardizing the impartial administration of 
justice. Agency independence, therefore, had due process implications. 
Furthermore, independence supported the application of expertise to 
government. If in fact agency commissioners were to apply their exper-
tise to solve problems in a scientific manner, fear of political reprisal 
would only hinder their ability to perform their jobs effectively. More-
over, the bipartisan-appointment and term-of-years requirements them-
selves represented congressional recognition that politics had a lesser role 
to play in the work of independent agencies. 
Working against the notions of agency independence were the 
equally compelling ideas that executive control of administrative agen-
cies was more constitutionally coherent and democratic. Before the New 
Deal, the Court had recognized in Myers v. United States 15 that Congress 
could not directly participate in the removal of executive officials. In 
declaring the Tenure in Office Act unconstitutional, the Court empha-
sized that the executive power resided in the President under article II. 
The Myers opinion (written by Chief Justice Taft, a former president) 
declared that for Congress to "draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the 
power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power 
... would be ... to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation 
of governmental powers."16 
From the perspective of democratic theory, the President is viewed 
as more responsive to the people than unelected agency officials, no mat-
ter how expert they might be. 17 This view has led recent administrations 
to focus on achieving greater executive control of administrative poli-
cymaking through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 18 The 
13. See Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (President could not remove commis· 
sioner without cause even where commission's enabling statute included no specific removal 
restriction). 
14. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629-30. The use of the qualifying "quasi" was necessary 
to avoid the delegation problem that would have arisen had the agency been viewed as the recipient 
of "pure" judicial and legislative power. 
15. 272 u.s. 52 (1926). 
16. /d. at 161. 
17. See Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. 
L. REV. 469, 520-24 (1985). 
18. Since the Ford administration, presidents have sought to exercise more control over admin· 
istrative agencies through executive orders. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1975), re· 
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 8315 (order of President Ford requiring 
agencies to submit statements analyzing inflationary impact of proposed regulation); Exec. Order 
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Reagan administration sought to perfect this control through an execu-
tive order that requires all executive agencies and encourages all in-
dependent agencies to provide OMB with a cost-benefit analysis of all 
"major" rules before promulgating them. 19 This approach is grounded 
on article II executive power, but its exercise has been controversial be-
cause it involves an assertion of presidential control over agencies that 
had heretofore enjoyed considerable policymaking freedom. 20 
Myers and Humphrey's Executor still define the constitutional de-
bate over the validity of independent agencies and the role each branch 
can play in removing officials. Myers struck down an attempt by Con-
gress to participate in the removal of a postmaster21 and Humphrey's 
Executor let stand a legislative restriction on the President's power to 
remove an independent agency commissioner.22 In Humphrey's Execu-
tor, the Court resolved the apparent tension with Myers by drawing an 
imaginary line between purely executive and quasi-judicial or quasi-legis-
lative offi.cials.23 The Court, acknowledging that the resolution was not 
perfect and would probably need to be refined, 24 placed the postmaster 
on the purely executive side and agency commissioners on the quasi-judi-
No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9680 (order 
of President Carter requiring agency heads to evaluate proposed regulations for need, simplicity, and 
effect); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34 
(1982) (order of President Reagan forbidding agencies from issuing regulations unless OMB has 
determined that benefits outweigh costs). 
19. See Exec. Order No. 12,291,3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34 
(1982); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 92-93 
(Supp. III 1985). Major rules are defined as those rules likely to result in: "(1) An annual effect on 
the economy of $100 million or more; (2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individ-
ual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or (3) Significant 
adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability 
of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export 
markets." Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 432 
(1982). 
20. See Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a 
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064-70 (1986) (criticizing OMB control ofrulemaking process 
as unnecessary and expensive overlay that undermines basic rulemaking principles of fairness and 
agency expertise). But see DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 
HARV. L. REv. 1075, 1082-88 (1986) (arguing that OMB regulatory review encourages policy coor-
dination, greater political accountability, and more balanced regulatory decisions). See generally 
Symposium on Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 TUL. L. REV. 811 (1982) 
(discussing practical administrative, judicial, and executive policy concerns regarding presidential 
involvement in agency rulemaking process). 
21. Myers, 272 U.S. at 175-76. 
22. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 631-32. 
23. Id. at 628. 
24. The Court stated in Humphrey's Executor: 
To the extent that, between the decision of the Myers case, which sustains the unrestrict-
able power of the President to remove purely executive officers, and our present decision 
that such power does not extend to an office such as that here involved, there shall remain a 
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cial or quasi-legislative side.25 
The Court correctly acknowledged the imperfection of its analysis. 
Any distinction based on the label "quasi" is bound to be unsatisfactory. 
Independent agencies frequently exercise functions similar to those per-
formed by all three branches. The separation-of-powers problem cannot 
be dismissed by qualifying labels. That the Humphrey's Executor ap-
proach worked for fifty years says more about congressional and presi-
dential restraint than anything else. Congress did not seek to place 
removal requirements upon officials who were traditionally executive, 
and presidents have been able to deal effectively with agency commis-
sioners in spite of the removal restrictions. 26 
Recently, however, both branches have raised removal questions 
and the courts have been forced to react. The independence of agencies 
has been subjected to careful scrutiny as a new generation of judges and 
legal scholars reexamines the place of administrative agencies in the tri-
partite system of government established by the Constitution. 
A. Beyond Quasi Analysis: Exploring Institutional Relationships. 
It has always been puzzling that the Court stated a proposition of 
agency independence from the three branches of government in 
Humphrey's Executor 27 on the same day that it struck down Roosevelt's 
NIRA on nondelegation grounds in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States. 28 It must have occurred to the Court that a grant of legis-
lative and judicial power to an entity independent of those branches 
would raise the very problem _of delegation it was addressing in 
Schechter. But the Court was silent on that point in Humphrey's Execu-
tor, inexplicably preferring to avoid it through the "quasi" technique. 
A partial explanation may be the political one-that in both 
Schechter and Humphrey's Executor the unreconstructed Supreme Court 
was striking a blow against the perceived excesses of the Roosevelt ad-
ministration. A more enduring answer, however, may lie in the nature of 
the recipients of the grants of power involved. In the NIRA, Congress 
gave broad powers directly to the President, thus jeopardizing its institu-
tional relationship with the Executive. In the grant to the independent 
field of doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within it for future consideration and deter-
mination as they may arise. 
Id. at 632. 
25. ld. at 627-28. 
26. It has even been said that some presidents have required resignations by independent corn-
missioners in advance of their appointment. See E. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND Pow-
ERS 1787-1957, at 379-80 n.87 (1957) (referring to President Calvin Coolidge). 
27. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629. 
28. 295 u.s. 495, 549-50 (1935). 
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agency, however, the beneficiary was a more neutral institution substan-
tially beyond the reach of both the Executive and Congress. Thus, as 
Professor Strauss has carefully demonstrated,29 the Court's concern with 
delegation in Schechter, and its lack of conc~m in Humphrey's Executor, 
can be explained from a checks-and-balances perspective. The grant of 
legislative power to the President in the NIRA created a significant shift 
in branch authority, whereas the restriction upon the removal power of 
the President augured no such outcome. Indeed, such restrictions served 
to insulate the agencies from both legislative and executive control. 
From a checks-and-balances perspective, the first action was destructive 
of interbranch parity and the second was not. Thus, a system of in-
dependent agencies that retained judicial, legislative, and even executive 
power did not jeopardize the relationships among the three branches. 30 
This analysis helps to explain not only the delegation-independence 
conundrum but also the continued vitality of cases like Myers. Myers 
involved the Tenure in Office Act,31 a statute that granted to Congress 
the right to participate, by senatorial concurrence, in the removal of an 
executive official. Humphrey's Executor involved restrictions upon the 
President's removal power through the for-cause limitation but no com-
parable expansion of the congressional role. The removal question lends 
itself, under this analysis, to a checks-and-balances resolution. In the 
Myers situation, Congress has sought to aggrandize power at the expense 
of the President; in the Humphrey's Executor situation, it has not. 32 
Under this analysis, Myers would have been a different case had the only 
removal restraint involved a for-cause requirement. 33 
A checks-and-balances approach asks the proper constitutional 
question: Is one branch trying to overreach and seize the powers of the 
other? Several recent separation-of-powers cases have built upon this 
distinction. In United States v. Nixon, 34 the Court stated that the separa-
29. See Strauss, Tlze Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 609-16 (1984). 
30. See id. at 579. 
31. 19 Stat. 80 (1876). The Act required senatorial assent to both appointment and removal of 
executive officials. Myers, 272 U.S. at 107. President Harding had ordered the removal of Myers as 
postmaster before his four-year term expired, without seeking senatorial concurrence. Id. at 106-07. 
32. Professor Strauss stated the point as follows: 
The issue of aggrandizement seems inevitable, however, where Congress asserts the right 
itself to control the removal question. It has not only limited the Presidenfs ordinary 
political authority by imposing a "for cause'' requirement, but also greatly expanded its 
own political authority by insisting on a voice in that determination. 
Strauss, supra note 29, at 614. 
33. The Myers Court itself probably would not have honored the distinction, however, since it 
suggested that the President could remove after the fact even quasi-judicial officials. See Myers, 272 
U.S. at 135. 
34. 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
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tion-of-powers question involved resolving "competing interests in a 
manner that preserves the essential function of each branch. " 35 In Nixon 
v. Administrator of General Services, 36 the Court asked whether the chal-
lenged act "disrupt[ed] the proper balance between the coordinate 
branches. " 37 This checks-and-balances approach is of crucial impor-
tance in evaluating the constitutional significance of the for-cause re-
moval restriction. 
B. Relationship of the Appointment Power to the Removal Power. 
The connection between appointment and removal is obvious and 
necessary. In Myers, the Court said that the appointing authority under 
the Constitution has sole removal authority.38 Although the Court 
avoided analyzing that question in Humphrey's Executor, recent cases 
clarifying the appointment power provide an opportunity to examine the 
continued relationship between removal restrictions and the appointment 
power. In Buckley v. Valeo, 39 the issue was whether legislative appoint-
ment of some members of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in-
fringed the President's appointment power. The Court used a checks-
and-balances approach to determine if the members of the FEC were 
"Officers of the United States,"40 officials over whom the President has 
the sole power of appointment. In finding that the duties of the members 
included executive agency functions such as rulemaking, the Court con-
cluded that the FEC members could be appointed only by the Presi-
dent.41 Buckley clarified the respective roles of the two branches in the 
appointment process, but it certainly did not answer all questions about 
the nature of those officials who fall within the President's control. 
Some officials who are members of commissions are still appointed 
by Congress. For example, members of the newly constituted Civil 
Rights Commission are appointed by both the President and Congress. 42 
35. Jd. at 707. 
36. 433 u.s. 425 (1977). 
37. Jd. at 443. 
38. Myers, 272 U.S. at 122 ("The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not 
the power of advising and consenting to appointment .... "). 
39. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam). 
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President is given sole power to appoint these officers, 
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. 
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41. 
42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975 (West Supp. 1986) (President appoints four members of the eight-mem-
ber commission; President Pro Tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House appoint two mem-
bers each). See generally Verkuil, Reflections upon Federal aud State Control of Admiuistratil'l! 
Policy Making, 19 SuFFOLK U.L. RRv. 577, 591-92 (1985) (discussing reasons why Commi~sion wn~ 
reconstituted as independent agency and extent to which its influence in advising President on civil 
rights matters has been diminished). 
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Distinguishing Buckley in his signing message, President Reagan as-
serted that the civil rights commissioners did not perform duties of of-
ficers of the United States.43 The courts have yet to rule on this 
interpretation. 44 
In the most recent case, a member of the Senate challenged the 
membership of the Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve 
Board on the ground that five of the twelve members are not appointed 
by the President pursuant to article II.45 The Open Market Committee 
sets and implements monetary policy by directing the Federal Reserve 
banks to purchase and sell securities. 46 The government defended this 
organizational structure against the Buckley argument by asserting that 
Open Market Committee members are "inferior officers," not "Officers 
of the United States," because they operate under the authority of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 One can, however, 
readily construct an argument that the policy decisions of the Open Mar-
ket Committee are significant enough to qualify its members as "Officers 
of the United States." That the Executive nevertheless supports agency 
independence, in apparent contradiction to its own interest, suggests the 
complexity of the role of the appointment power. The court, indeed, re-
jected this argument, stating that it would be a "distortion of the lan-
guage to label as 'inferior officers' members of a body vested with the vast 
powers of the [Open Market Committee]."48 The court nevertheless 
went on to hold that the arrangement was constitutional, relying heavily 
on a long history of independence on the part of national banking offi-
cials and political acceptance of that independence. 49 
This experience suggests that the President and Congress may have 
reason to agree upon a sharing of the appointment power in certain cir-
cumstances, much as they have over the years agreed on the use of for-
43. See Verkuil, supra note 42, at 591 n.63. 
44. Alleging that their terms, even in what was admittedly an executive agency, were protected 
by Humphrey's Executor, the holdover members from President Carter's original Civil Rights Com-
mission had earlier brought suit to challenge their dismissal by President Reagan. See Berry v. 
Reagau, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 33,898 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1983), dismissed as moot, 32 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 33,925 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 1983). Berry was dismissed as moot because the 
appointment period expired during litigation. So far, no Buckley-Synar suit has been commenced 
against the new Commission. 
45. Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1986). Seven of the 
members are governors of the Federal Reserve Board appointed by the President with senatorial 
concurrence. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1982). The other five members are selected by the boards of direc-
tors of the various Federal Reserve banks on a regional basis. I d. 
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 263(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 270 (1986). 
47. See Melcher, 644 F. Supp. at 519. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 521-23. 
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cause removal provisions. 50 Although such an agreement does not en-
sure judicial acceptance, it can lead to an analysis that looks closely at 
the duties of those purporting to act as "Officers of the United States." 
The analysis of such an agreement to share the appointment responsibil-
ity for agency officials should be conducted in the same checks-and-bal-
ances terms as the removal provisions: Does the congressional 
appointment power deprive the President of control over someone' who 
must exercise significant executive power? If it does, Buckley closes the 
door, even when the President wishes to leave it open. 
But the Court in Buckley did not seem willing to take the step taken 
in Myers: that of tying the removal power exclusively to the appoint-
ment power.51 Although there was no express "for cause" removal re-
striction in the Act establishing the FEC, it is doubtful that the President 
would be permitted to remove FEC commissioners without assigning 
cause. Thus, while one can conclude after Buckley that the removal 
power is not tied exclusively to the appointment power, the Court did not 
entirely clarify the limits of congressional removal restrictions. 
C. The Comptroller General as an Executive Policymaker and the 
Administration's Assault on Independent Agencies. 
The Reagan administration has argued in a variety of settings that 
congressional restrictions on executive removal of the Comptroller Gen-
eral under the Deficit Reduction Act or on independent agencies in gen-
eral are unconstitutional. In Synar v. United States, 52 a three-judge court 
accepted the administration's position. The court declared that the pro-
visions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
198553-popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act-were 
unconstitutional because they vested executive powers in the Comptrol-
ler General, an official subject to removal only by Congress. The court 
determined that the Comptroller fell, for removal purposes, between the 
purely executive official, controlled by Myers, and the quasi-judicial or 
quasi-legislative official, controlled by Humphrey's Executor. 54 From 
this vantage point, the court concluded that because the Comptroller was 
removable by Congress he could not exercise the executive budget-cut-
50. The independent agencies are the product of legislation signed by the President; this legisla· 
tion contains removal restrictions in many cases. Of course a president's acquiescence in this man· 
ner is not determinative in legal challenges; it was not, for example, determinative in Bowsher v. 
Synar. 
51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
52. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 
(1986). The three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982). 
53. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-922 (West Supp. 1986). 
54. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1400. 
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ting functions granted under the Act. 55 
The three-judge court felt bound by Humphrey's Executor, but, like 
the administration, it questioned whether the concept of agency indepen-
dence squared with the President's removal power under article II. The 
court commented that "[i]t is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 
1930's that there can be such things as genuinely 'independent' agen-
cies."56 The court's skepticism about independent agencies is based on 
the inherent anomaly of the "fourth branch" idea. In the case of execu-
tive officials, the focus of removal power under the Constitution resides 
with the President. The role of Congress in this regard is expressly lim-
ited to removal pursuant to the impeachment clause. 57 
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the 
Department of Justice contemporaneously advanced a similar approach 
in Ameron, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 58 a case involving a controversy 
over the Comptroller General's authority under the Competition in Con-
tracting Act.59 The government argued that the Comptroller's involve-
ment in the executive process of procurement was unconstitutional due 
to Congress's power of removal. The Third Circuit expressly disagreed 
with the three-judge court in Synar. 60 On the removal point, it held that 
there was nothing wrong with independent agencies and found little rea-
son to distinguish the Comptroller General from them. 61 Ameron is 
loyal to Humphrey's Executor almost to a fault, however; it seems more 
intent on uncritically celebrating the fourth branch idea than worrying 
about how that concept can be made to fit within the Constitution. 
Attorney General Meese has frequently questioned whether agen-
cies exercising executive powers may be independent of presidential au-
thority, stating on one occasion that "[f]ederal agencies performing 
executive functions are themselves properly agents of the executive. 
55. Id. at 1403. 
56. !d. at 1398. The court indicated that the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983), undercut the principles of Humphrey's Executor. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 
1398. 
57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
58. 787 F.2d 875, 885 (3d Cir. 1986). 
59. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3551-3556 (West Supp. 1986). The Comptroller General is called upon 
under the Act to hear protests from disappointed bidders. ld. § 3352. Tlte filing of a protest freezes 
the award process and gives the Comptroller 90 days to recommend a decision to the agency. Id. 
§ 3554. The Department of Justice, on behalf of the Corps of Engineers, argued that due to the 
Comptroller's impermissible involvement in the executive procurement process, the stay provisions 
were inoperable. Amerou, 787 F.2d at 888. 
60. Amerou, 787 F.2d at 885. The Ameron court also disagreed with the Syuar court's conclu· 
sion that the challenge to the Comptroller's status was ripe. Id. at 884. 
61. The Ameron court stated that the General Accounting Office ••is best viewed as a part of a 
headless 'fourth branch' of government consisting of independent agencies having significant duties 
in both the legislative and executive branches but residing in neither." ld. at 886. 
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They are not 'quasi' this or 'independent' that. In the tripartite scheme 
of government, a body with enforcement powers is part of the executive 
branch of government."62 Because the administration believes that both 
direct congressional removal and congressional restraints upon presiden-
tial removal are unconstitutional, its argument transcends the specific 
challenge to the Comptroller General. The administration's argument 
more broadly challenges the for-cause requirement common to independ-
ent agency removal that was honored in Humphrey's Executor. 
To date, only one court has faced litigants who have advanced the 
administration's position. In Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. FTC, 63 the 
plaintiff insurance companies asserted that the Commission's commence-
ment of an unfair methods of competition action violated article II by 
placing the executive power of prosecutorial discretion in an entity in-
dependent of the executive branch. The insurance companies asserted 
that the removal restriction contained in the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (FTCA)64 was the basis for independence. Thus, Ticor presented the 
first direct challenge to the power of independent agencies to enforce the 
law and, of necessity, presented an invitation to reconsider Humphrey's 
Executor. 65 The district court dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, 66 
but the issue is certain to arise either in Ticor or elsewhere, now that the 
Attorney General has in effect invited constitutional challenges to the 
independent agency. 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BOWSHER V. SYNAR 
The key inquiry is whether the for-cause removal restraint is by it-
self significant enough to frustrate the power to execute the law that arti-
cle II clearly entrusts to the Executive. In this setting, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar 61 takes on added significance. 
A. Bowsher v. Synar. 
In the fifty years since Humphrey's Executor was decided, the 
Supreme Court has had no better opportunity to explore the limits and 
meaning of agency independence than the challenge to the Balanced 
62. Taylor, supra note 4. 
63. 625 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86·5078 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1986). 
64. 15 u.s.c. §§ 41-77 (1982). 
65. Humphrey's Executor approved the FTC organization which included the same 
prosecutorial powers mentioned by the plaintiff.~ in Ticor. However, on appeal, the plaintiff.~ argued 
that Humphrey's Executor did not directly address the prosecutorial issue when it upheld the re-
moval provision. Sec Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 59-64, Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, No. 86-
5078 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1986). 
66. Ticor, 625 F. Supp. at 751-52. 
67. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). 
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Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in Bowsher v. Synar. Under 
the Act, the role of the Comptroller General was pivotal, with that office 
being called upon to present to the President binding budget-reduction 
calculations. 68 The Comptroller General was given discretion to make 
these calculations after receiving reports from the directors of OMB and 
the Congressional Budget Office. 69 The Comptroller's tenure, however, 
was controlled by a provision that permitted congressional removal for 
specified malefactions by joint resolution subject to presidential veto. 70 
The issue before the Court was whether such legislative control over 
an official who was clearly exercising executive, policymaking responsi-
bilities was permissible given the Constitution's scheme of separation of 
powers. The Court answered in the negative and sought to clarify the 
concept of agency independence that has been muddled since 
Humphrey's Executor. Although four Justices wrote opinions, Chief Jus-
tice Burger's majority opinion and Justice White's dissent together pro-
vide the most helpful insights into how the Court might decide a latter-
day Humphrey's Executor case.71 
At stake in Bowsher was the structural constitutional question, 
much like the one raised in INS v. Chadha, 12 of how many strings Con-
gress can attach when it grants legislative power to an executive official. 
In Chadha, the Court deemed the legislative veto to be too much of a 
restraint on the executive power to administer legislation involving both 
68. 2 U.S.C.A. § 90l(b)(l) (West Supp. 1986). 
69. Sectiou 251 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 
U.S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1986), provides for "automatic" reductions through reporting provi-
sions involving the directors ofOMB and the Congressional Budget Office, who are independently to 
estimate the amount of the deficit for the coming year and (if it exceeds the target maximum by more 
than a specified amount) to calculate the program-by-program budget reductions necessary to reduce 
the deficit to the maximum allowable. /d. § 901(a). These reductions are then reported to the 
Comptroller General for an independent evaluation which is presented to the President who must 
issue a "sequestration" order mandating the spending reductions. /d. § 901(b). 
70. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (providing for removal by Congress "at any time" based upon: (i) 
permanent disability; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct 
involving moral turpitude). This Act also provides for removal of the Comptroller by impeachment, 
which, as a remedy stemming directly from the Constitution, need not have been expressed in statu-
tory terms. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3. A 1980 amendment provides that the President is to nominate 
the Comptroller General from a Jist of three individuals recommended by a commission composed of 
the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the majority and minority 
leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and other designated members of Congress. 
See id. § 703(a)(2). The litigants in Bowsher did not chaJlenge that "limitation" upon the President's 
appointment power. 
71. Justice Scalia's views can be found in the lower court opinion. See Synar v. United States, 
626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). 
72. 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). Chief Justice Burger, who wrote both majority opinions, asserted 
that C!tad!ta "supports" the conclusions reached in Bowsher. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189. 
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executive and independent administrative agencies.73 In Bowsher, the ex-
cessive restraint was a joint resolution removal provision that gave Con-
gress potential control over an official-the Comptroller General-who 
was performing an executive function under the Act. Chief Justice Bur-
ger concluded that under the Constitution, Congress could not have it 
both ways: 
To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws would 
be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could simply 
remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any 
fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congres-
sional control over the execution of laws, Chadha makes clear, is con-
stitutionally impermissible. 74 
The Court's bright-line approach to the separation-of-powers problems 
in Bowsher prompted a strong dissent from Justice White, who decried 
the "distressing formalistic view"75 reflected in Bowsher and Chadha. 
The Court's formulation in Chadha led to a rejection of all forms of legis-
lative vetoes that had appeared in some 200 statutory formulations over a 
fifty-year period. In Bowsher the Court rejected a congressional removal 
technique that had gone unchallenged for more than sixty years. Bow-
sher, like Chadha, therefore expressed an unqualified constitutional limi-
tation of congressional power based on separation-of-powers doctrine. 
This categorical approach might lead observers to believe that a third 
broad case-against the constitutionality of independent agencies-may 
also succeed. There are signs in Bowsher, however, that indicate the 
Court will not go that far. Bowsher, furthermore, provides important 
indications of the permissible scope and nature of restrictions placed on 
the President's power to remove independent agency officials. 
B. Bowsher v. Synar-Legitimizing the Independent Agency Idea. 
Bowsher v. Synar legitimizes the idea of the independent agency. 
Surprisingly, it is Justice White's dissent that provides the key insights 
into the place of the independent agency and the role of removal restric-
tions in our constitutional system of government. 
The majority opinion initially observed that the issue at bar did not 
cast doubt on the status of independent agencies.76 The Court then 
quoted approvingly from Humphrey's Executor, cited a later removal 
73. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
74. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189. 
75. /d. at 3205 (White, J., dissenting). 
76. /d. at 3188 n.4 ("Appellants therefore are wide of the murk in arguing that an affirmance in 
this case requires casting doubt on the status of 'independent' agencies because no issues involving 
such agencies are presented here."). 
Vol. 1986:779] INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 793 
case, Weiner v. United States, 77 and concluded that "Congress cannot 
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the exe-
cution of the laws except by impeachment."78 This conclusion does not 
compel the correlative proposition that Congress may limit the Presi-
dent's authority to remove an executive official, but it surely invites an 
affirmative response. If there were indeed serious constitutional 
problems in the Justices' minds about limits on the President's removal 
authority, they would hardly have based their decision on Humphrey's 
Executor. 
Justice White in dissent expanded upon Humphrey's Executor in 
several interesting ways. First, he reiterated that the Court rejected the 
position urged by the Solicitor General that executive powers of the sort 
granted to the Comptroller by the Act may be exercised only by officers 
removable at will by the President.79 Justice White then argued that the 
removal power was within the power of Congress under the necessary 
and proper clause "to vest authority that falls within the Court's defini-
tion of executive power in officers who are not subject to removal at will 
by the President and are therefore not under the President's direct con-
trol."80 For this proposition White cited Humphrey's Executor and Wei-
ner, in effect crediting these cases with a major role in formulating a 
legislative-executive checks-and-balances doctrine. 
Justice White also examined the qualification in Humphrey's Execu-
tor that has led to confusion over the reach of that decision and its con-
tinued vitality. In Humphrey's Executor the Court emphasized the 
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial roles that FTC commissioners were 
meant to play, thereby deemphasizing the "executive" nature of their 
functions. 81 Justice White found the power of an FTC commissioner to 
implement, interpret, and apply an act of Congress (the FTCA) to be an 
executive function equivalent to that performed by the Comptroller Gen-
eral under the Deficit Reduction Act. 82 In drawing this equivalency, 
White legitimized the FTC executive function, including the exercise of 
prosecutorial powers, and invited Congress to modify its control over the 
Comptroller in similar ways. 
Both the majority and Justice White recognized the validity of the 
congressional for-cause removal process and would make it applicable to 
purely executive officials beyond the category of collegial agency officials 
77. 351 u.s. 349 (1958). 
78. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188. 
79. Id. at 3206 (White, J., dissenting). 
80. Id. 
81. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 624. 
82. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3207 n.3 (White, J., dissenting). 
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such as those at the FTC. Although "head-counting" is a precarious 
proposition at best, it would seem that most, if not all, of the Justices will 
probably accept this extension of logic, though Justice Scalia may remain 
a skeptic. 83 
C. The Reach of the For-cause Requirement over Executive Officials. 
Bowsher also suggests limits on the degree to which for-cause re-
quirements may be imposed on executive officials. Nearly everyone ac-
cepts the idea that removal of commissioners of independent agencies can 
be subject to restrictions; removal of other executive officials such as the 
Comptroller General might be subject to restrictions as well. Addition-
ally, nearly everyone would agree that Congress cannot impose removal 
restrictions on some executive officials, such as cabinet officers; those offi-
cials must serve at the pleasure of the President. Bowsher helps to draw a 
line between these two generally accepted situations. 
Justice White's dissent helps determine the class of officials that 
must serve at the pleasure of the President. Justice White critiqued an 
observation that Justice Holmes made in his dissent in Myers. 84 Holmes 
asserted that executive functions are, in any event, controlled by the sub-
stance of the laws passed by Congress. Justice White disagreed: 
Justice Holmes perhaps overstated his case, for there are undoubtedly 
executive functions that, regardless of the enactments of Congress, 
must be performed by officers subject to removal at will by the Presi-
dent. Whether a particular function falls within this class or within 
the far larger class that may be relegated to independent officers "will 
depend upon the character of the office."85 
Justice White then proposed an approach for defining the class of 
executive officials the President must be able to remove at will. The 
touchstone, according to White, is whether a removal restraint "prevents 
the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions."86 By this test one could expect the foreign affairs function of 
the Secretary of State to be sacrosanct, because the President must have 
the absolute loyalty of cabinet level officers. 87 However, this test would 
not prevent Congress from putting for-cause removal restrictions on offi-
83. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
84. Myers, 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The duty of the President to see that the 
laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than 
Congress sees fit to leave within his power."). 
85. Bowsher. 106 S. Ct. at 3207 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. 
at 631). 
86. /d. (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
87. Under the Constitution, the President has the power to appoint all heads of departments 
and such officers of the United States as Congress shall establish by law. U.S. CaNST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 
2. 
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cials such as the administrator of the EPA, the head of the FDA, or 
other similar executive officials because such restraints would not prevent 
the executive branch from performing its function of supervising those 
officials. Thus, under Justice White's approach, one first asks whether 
the function the official performs could be made in any way independent 
of the Executive. If it could, then the for-cause removal provision has a 
place; if it could not, then the for-cause removal provision violates article 
II. 
D. The Availability of Judicial Review of For-cause Removals. 
Another debate carried on between the majority and Justice White 
involved what might be thought an elementary issue-whether judicial 
review would obtain if the President removed an independent agency offi-
cial for cause. The question is significant because it may well affect how 
Congress responds to Bowsher v. Synar. The question has never arisen 
because no president has ever sought to remove an independent agency 
official pursuant to a statutory for-cause process. Humphrey's Executor 
arose because President Roosevelt specifically refused to initiate for-
cause proceedings, preferring instead to remove the FTC commissioner 
for reasons of what might be labeled incompatibility. 88 
Justice White made two points about the removal of the Comptrol-
ler to buttress his conclusion that congressional involvement in removal 
was insignificant: joint-resolution removal was limited to the stated 
terms of the statute (inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance); and 
posttermination judicial review was available "to ensure that a hearing 
had in fact been held and that the finding of cause for removal was not 
arbitrary."89 
Surprisingly, though the majority treated Justice White's reasoning 
with skepticism,90 it reached the same result on the issue of judicial re-
88. The President's removal letter to Humphrey merely stated: "Effective as of this date you 
are hereby removed from the office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission." 
Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 619. Earlier, President Roosevelt had written to Humphrey the 
following: 
You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together 
on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, 
I think it is best for the people of this country that I should have a "full confidence." 
I d. Obviously the President, with the Myers precedent in hand, would not have wanted to concede 
any legislative authority to curtail his removal power. But today it has been suggested that policy 
incompatibility might be viewed as an aspect of enumerated causes for removal. See Strauss, supra 
note 29, at 615-16. 
89. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3211 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White cited Humphrey's Execu-
tor on the question of the availability of judicial review. I d. at 3211 & n.8. 
90. Id. at 3190-91 & 3190 n.8 (stating that dissent failed to recognize breadth of grounds for 
removal of Comptroller General and that judicial assessment of risk and political realities cannot be 
determinative in any event). 
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view. The majority distinguished Humphrey's Executor on the ground 
that it involved nonstatutory judicial review, not review of presidential 
removal sought in accordance with the for-cause removal provision.91 
But it is difficult not to conclude that such a proposition should follow a 
fortiori. Humphrey's Executor seems to assume that review would be 
available if a president removed for cause. In addition, the judicial re-
view provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act92 and the general 
presumption of judicial review accorded final agency action93 make it 
unlikely that judicial review would be unavailable, unless Congress spe-
cifically so declared.94 Thus, although its reason for criticizing Justice 
White is unclear, the majority would ultimately have to concede that 
judicial review would obtain· if the President remoyed an agency official 
for cause. 
E. The Definition of "Cause. " 
The other questions raised by the majority opinion-whether the 
for-cause standards are exclusive, and, if they are, what they mean-are 
also of critical importance. If, as some have argued,95 "cause" for presi-
dential removal of agency officials might mean nothing more than policy 
incompatibility, then the statutory removal provision would be far less 
restrictive, even if it were subjected to judicial review. The majority left 
open the questions whether the statutory removal terms of "inefficiency," 
"neglect of duty," or "malfeasance" are exclusive and whether, even if 
exclusive, they might encompass the broad concept of "maladministra-
tion," which the Court noted had specifically been dropped from the im-
peachment clause. 96 
If "maladministration" includes policy incompatibility, then the 
President's removal power would be expanded greatly. It would, for ex-
ample, have justified Roosevelt's removal of Humphrey.97 Conceptually, 
91. /d. at 3190 & n.8. 
92. 5 u.s.c. §§ 500, 701-706 (1982). 
93. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) ("(O]nly upon a showing of 
'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to 
judicial review."). But see Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349-51 (1984) ("clear 
and convincing evidence" test for overcoming presumption of judicial review is not rigid evidentiary 
test, but only useful reminder that can be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history 
reliably indicating congressional intent). 
94. Which, of course, Congress would not do if it were trying to retain the maximum permissi· 
ble constitutional control over the President's removal power. 
95. See Strauss, supra note 29, at 615-16. 
96. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3190 ("[The Constitutional Convention] rejected language that 
would have permitted impeachment for 'maladministration,' with Madison arguing that '[s]o vague 
a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.' " (citation omitted)). 
97. See Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to William E. Humphrey, quoted supra note 88. 
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this expansion of definition could make an independent agency official 
removable at the discretion of the President, which is what Madison 
feared in connection with the use of the term in the impeachment 
clause.98 This concern may lead to a judicial construction against a 
broad definition of maladministration. Even if it did not, it is unlikely 
that a president would exercise such broad removal powers frequently 
since political constraints operate on him as well. He would, after all, 
have to get the Senate to confirm the individual he appoints to replace 
the dismissed official.99 
As a purely legal proposition, Bowsher does not indicate whether the 
traditional statutory removal terms will ensure against presidential re-
moval for other causes. Nor does it indicate how "cause" is to be de-
fined.100 Obviously the administrative hearing process and subsequent 
judicial review will play an important role in determining the breadth of 
statutory removal terms and in defining cause. 
III. THE FUTURE OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 
Viewed broadly, Bowsher v. Synar sends mixed signals concerning 
the question of executive control over independent agency officials. It 
withdraws Congress from the removal process, short of the express con-
stitutional remedy of impeachment. This is a dramatic exercise of the 
doctrine of separation of powers, and it has compelling textual support. 
If one stops here, it can be said that Bowsher strongly favors the execu-
tive branch. 
When one analyzes all of the opinions, a more balanced and less 
final picture emerges. First, Humphrey's Executor maintains vitality de-
spite the lower court's grudging recognition of its validity. 101 The 
Supreme Court's active use of Humphrey's Executor counsels against au-
tomatic acceptance of Attorney General Meese's call for an end to all 
legislative controls over independent agency removal.1°2 
98. See supra note 96. 
99. President Reagan's difficulty with restructuring the Civil Rights Commission, traditionally 
an executive agency, is instructive with respect to the political limits of executive removal even where 
no "for cause" limitation exists. See Verkuil, supra note 42, at 591-92. 
100. Indeed one could even argue that the terms "inefficiency" and "neglect of duty," if not 
"malfeasance," could be construed so as to encompass a general charge of maladministration, in 
which event even if the terms of removal are deemed to be exclusive they could still be satisfied by a 
removal by the President on the ground of policy incompatibility. Of course Congress could make 
the limitations on removal for cause more explicit as well as exclusive. 
101. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398-99 (D.D.C.) (per curiam) (asserting 
that Chadha may have presaged the demise of Humphrey's Executor by invalidating "quasi-legisla-
tive" activities but noting that Supreme Court's signals were not clear enough to disregard 
Humphrey:r Executor), ajf'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). 
102. See Taylor, supra note 4. 
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Second, Bowsher suggests that the holding of Humphrey's Executor 
remains relevant not only to the independence of commissions that exer-
cise quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers, but also to some purely 
executive officials, such as the Comptroller General. 103 Bowsher does 
not, however, make clear which executive official positions could be sub-
ject to removal restrictions. Here is where legislative and executive at-
tention is likely to be focused. 
Although Bowsher implies that Congress can place Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor-like removal restraints on executive officials such as the Comptrol-
ler General, such restraints at some point impinge on constitutional 
executive branch responsibilities. Removal restrictions on cabinet offi-
cials come immediately to mind, but an extension of removal restrictions 
to an executive official like the Director of OMB is also problematic. In 
the case of OMB, the President's need for unfettered control is premised 
on the coordinating role that office plays in the executive branch. None-
theless, congressional reactions to Bowsher might well include expansion 
of control in these more adventuresome directions. A revival of earlier 
proposals to legislate explicit executive controls over independent agen-
cies in return for more congressional participation in the process of 
agency governance is the minimum that might be expected. 104 
A. Determining the Need for Independence from Executive Removal. 
Bowsher draws clear constitutional lines for the present, but implies 
blurred relationships down the road. The relationship between agencies 
and the President would be much clearer if agency independence could 
be jettisoned once and for all, as Attorney General Meese has suggested. 
The difficulty is accepting an administrative system \vithout some par-
tially independent actors. The fourth branch idea may be a constitu-
tional impossibility, but it has an appeal in certain contexts. In order to 
evaluate the continued need for some independence from presidential re-
moval control, the focus is best placed upon two inherently executive 
functions: administrative policymaking and prosecution. In both situa-
tions the issue is whether the independent agencies, admittedly exercising 
103. See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188-91. Humphrey's Executor dealt with independence of adju-
dicatory agencies that were created to emulate courts: 
The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of its duties, net 
with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy 
of the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial 
and quasi-legislative. 
Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 624. The Comptroller General's duties are far more "political" 
and "executive'' as Humphrey's Executor understood those terms, yet Bowsher draws no distinction 
on that basis. 
)04. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUII., supra note 7, § 9.5.3, at 516-17 (discussing 
regulatory reform proposals). 
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executive authority and under executive control for some purposes, can 
make decisions at least partially free from such control by virtue of the 
for-cause removal restraints. 
1. Independence and Executive Policymaking. Administrative 
agencies make policy through the process of promulgating binding and 
enforceable rules. Although Congress grants power to the agencies, the 
exercise of that power is at the core of executive responsibility. The Pres-
ident is elected precisely to implement those policies on which he has 
campaigned. An independent agency with its own agenda can frustrate 
this democratic process. It becomes important then for a President to be 
able to assert policymaking control over independent agencies through 
the rulemaking process. The last four presidents-Nixon through Rea-
gan-have sought to achieve this policymaking control through an ex-
pansion by executive order of the coordinating powers of OMB over the 
independent agencies. 105 Although debates continue over the degree to 
which OMB can "manage" the rulemaking process, 106 there is little 
doubt that as a constitutional matter the executive power to "take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed"107 permits much policymaking con-
trol. Indeed, although no executive orders have so far directly subjected 
independent agencies to OMB reporting requirements, the reluctance to 
do so seems based more on political than legal considerations.108 
The value that independence serves relates directly to the kind of 
agency under consideration and the functions it performs. Agencies that 
make policy may also adjudicate; independence for adjudication is cer-
tainly desirable and has due process overtones.109 Some formal restric-
tions upon removal of those officials is an appropriate method of 
legitimizing the adjudicatory function. 
In addition, some agencies with pure policymaking functions, such 
as the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Election Commission, 
105. See supra note 18. For a discussion of the attempts by Nixon, Ford, and Carter to achieve 
control, see Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 943, 947-49 (1980). 
106. See Demuth & Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1083-88. 
107. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3. 
108. See Verkuil, supra note 105, at 949-52. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso-
ciation recently resolved that "[t]he Constitutional principles that justify presidential involvement in 
rulemaking activities are applicable to both the executive and independent agencies and, thus, the 
executive orders should be extended to the independent agencies." ABA Report to tire House of 
Delegates, 1986 A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN. L. RES. 100. But the current administration may not feel it 
needs to extend formal control. After six years in office, President Reagan has had the opportunity 
to replace or reappoint almost all of the independent agency officials. After six years of OMB super-
vision, it is doubtful that the administration's agenda has been misunderstood by those agencies. 
109. See R. PIHRCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 7, §§ 9.2-9.2.2, at 484-89. 
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seem best insulated from total executive control. The commissioners on 
both agencies, albeit for different reasons, deserve congressional insula-
tion from unexplained and arbitrary executive removal. Congress has 
recognized this need. In the case of the Federal Reserve Board, Congress 
fixed the term of the Chairman as well as of the members.tto In the case 
of the Federal Election Commission, Congress was initially so concerned 
that it violated the appointments clause of the Constitution in seeking to 
retain the power to name some of the commissioners. ttl 
Unfettered executive removal of commissioners from either agency 
presents a potential conflict of interest between the executive branch and 
the public interest. In the case of the Federal Reserve Board, it is the 
sense that monetary policy benefits from institutionally established 
checks and balances; in the case of the Federal Election Commission, it is 
the fear that partisanship might affect the outcome of future elections. 
Congress, after being rebuffed in Buckley on its appointments effort, re-
mains acutely concerned about whether a President might use removal of 
FEC commissioners as a means to achieve partisan control of the polit-
ical process.112 So long as the congressional limitation upon removal of 
these independent policymakers does not threaten the Executive's role 
under the Constitution, 113 there are more reasons to favor than to oppose 
removal restraints. 
2. Independence and the Prosecutoria/ Function. There can 
hardly be a function more executive in nature than that of commencing 
prosecution for violations of criminal and civil laws.114 This function 
involves highly discretionary decisionmaking; therefore, the context of 
any legislative impediment should be closely scrutinized and justified. 
One sufficient context would be that in which executive policymaking 
presented a conflict of interest. For example, such a conflict would be 
constitutionally sufficient to justify the legislative creation of a special 
110. The members of the Federal Reserve Board serve 14-year terms. The Chairman's four-year 
term is protected by a for-cause removal statute. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1982). Most other independent 
agencies, such as the FfC, the FCC, the SEC, and the NLRB, have statutory restrictions upon 
removal of commissioners but do not protect the term of the chairman (as chairman). Thus in these 
situations the chairman serves at the pleasure of the President. 
Ill. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 135 (1976). 
112. Although Buckley did not address the issue directly, the case can be read as sympathetic to 
imposing for-cause restraints upon the removal of FEC commissioners, which is the technique Con-
gress was forced to employ where its direct power of appointment was rejected. See Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 135-36. 
113. See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3206-07 (White, J., dissenting). 
114. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 3. The President's power faithfully to execute the national 
law was one of the most noncontroversial propositions considered at the Constitutional Convention. 
SeeM. FARRAND, THH RHCORDS OF THE FHDHRAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21-67 (rev. ed. 1937). 
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prosecutor whose function would be to investigate crimes committed by 
executive-branch officials who could not be expected to prosecute 
themselves. I Is 
The classic administrative prosecutorial functions traditionally per-
formed by independent agencies like the Federal Trade Commission and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission present a different situation. 
The conflict-of-interest argument does not justify independence here be-
cause the Attorney General prosecutes similar civil and criminal cases 
directly.I 16 The justification for prosecutorial independence through for-
cause removal restrictions must be based on other grounds. 
Humphrey's Executor is the primary precedent that justifies for-
cause removal restrictions over agency prosecutors.117 Although 
Humphrey's Executor dealt more with what it labeled "quasi-legislative" 
and "quasi-judicial" functions, it approved an organizational scheme that 
had a "quasi-prosecutional" aspect as well. In Bowsher's extensive dis-
cussion of Humphrey's Executor, there was no reference to the precise 
issue of executive power over the prosecutorial function. Nonetheless, 
the opinions do provide a framework for evaluating the prosecution-in-
dependent agency issue. 
The Court might reject a separation-of-powers challenge to the 
prosecutorial function within the independent administrative agency 
based on Justice White's analysis of Humphrey's Executor in his Bowsher 
dissent. He argued that only a legislative restraint that threatens the core 
power of the executive branch should be constitutionally suspect. IIS The 
prosecutorial function of agencies like the FTC presents a minimal threat 
to the President's power. Agencies exercising their prosecutorial func-
tion have the power to commence administrative prosecutions, yet the 
115. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTlTUTIONAL LAW 192 (1978). Under the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act§ 601(a), 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1982), the Attorney General may call for an appointment of 
an "independent counsel" by the judiciary. The decision not to seek such an appointment, however, 
has been insulated from judicial review. See Banzhafv. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). For a critical discussion of executive discretion in this context, see Note, The Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act of 1978: Problems with the Attorney General's Discretion and Proposals for Reform. 
1985 DUKE L.J. 497. 
116. The Justice Department enforces the same antitrust laws as does the FTC. See T. V AKER-
Ics, ANTITRUST BASICS § 2.01 n.9 (1985). 
117. Recent litigation challenges the prosecution function of the FTC on constitutional grounds. 
Judicial resolution has so far been deferred on ripeness grounds. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 
625 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 86-5078 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs' brief on ap-
peal in Ticor places much emphasis on the lower court decision in Synar which, as noted above, 
reluctantly accepted the Humphrey's Executor precedent. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 43. The 
Supreme Court was far less equivocal on that score, however. See supra notes 76-82 and accompa-
nying text. 
118. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3207 (White, J., dissenting). This is similar to the approach taken by 
Professor Strauss. See Strauss, supra note 29, at 630-31. 
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Attorney General represents the agencies in court119 and has the ultimate 
power, through the Solicitor General, to decide what position the United 
States will take before the Supreme Court.t2o 
Separating the prosecutorial function from those agencies or elimi-
nating the for-cause removal restraints would undeniably enhance the 
executive power. But the qualification on that power hardly threatens 
the executive branch. The power to remove under Humphrey's Executor 
and Bowsher still rests exclusively in the President. Exercise of the prose-
cution function by an independent agency can be supervised through this 
oversight mechanism, as well as through the appointment process. If 
requiring the President to exercise the removal power in a studied rather 
than impetuous way through the for-cause provision is a reasonable re-
straint, then dividing the prosecution function between independent and 
cabinet officials does not seem unreasonable. 121 Although the issue may 
well be analyzed anew in an age of formal adherence to the doctrine of 
separation of powers, Humphrey's Executor encourages the conclusion 
that independent agencies may constitutionally exercise the prosecutorial 
function. Nothing in Bowsher upsets Humphrey's Executor in this 
regard. 
B. Congressional Responses to Bowsher v. Synar. 
The question before Congress is how to revise the Deficit Control 
Act to preserve some role for the Comptroller General in the deficit eal-
culation process. This task remains a high priority because Congress 
does not trust the Director of OMB to provide accurate deficit figures or 
to administer the budget cuts with fairness. 122 Congress would undoubt-
edly prefer a continuing role for the Comptroller General. To achieve 
this goal without violating the Constitution, Congress must reach some 
compromise over the congressional removal restriction that has been the 
law since 1921. If in fact this removal restriction is trivial, as the dissent-
ing opinions of Justices White and Blackmun in Bowsher imply, 123 then 
Congress should have little difficulty in achieving an acceptable revision 
119. 28 u.s.c. § 516 (1982). 
120. Disagreement between the Solicitor General and the agency involved occasionally leads to 
the anomaly of the United States opposing itself. See, e.g., United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426,431-
32 (1949). Generally speaking, however, the Solicitor General, who is part of the Justice Depart· 
ment, formulates the positions of the United States in consultation with the Attorney General. 
121. Of course this does not suggest that it makes regulatory sense to have two federal entities 
enforcing the same antitrust laws. See Gellhom, Regulatory Reform and tlze Federal Trade Commis· 
sion's Antitrust Jurisdiction, 49 TENN. L. REv. 471, 497-99 (1982). 
122. Representative Thomas Foley of Washington, the House Democratic Whip, stated: "There 
is no question there is a degree of distrust of OMB." N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at D2, col. 2. 
123. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3208-15, 3218-20. 
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of the statute. But because this is an issue viewed in branch rivalry 
terms, strong political forces at work in Congress may make any compro-
mise difficult. 124 Nonetheless, the following four suggestions seem 
warranted. 
First, Congress should recognize that it can constitutionally relax its 
grip on the Comptroller General through a revision of the removal pro-
cess with little sacrifice in terms of practical control. The cleanest option 
open to Congress is to revise the 1921 Act to make the Comptroller Gen-
eral removable for cause by the President.l25 Such a revision would end 
congressional removal control over the Comptroller but would restrict 
the President's ability to achieve removal. Indeed, were Congress to 
make such a revision and were the Court to sustain it, as Bowsher indi-
cates the Court would, the decision would expand the applicability of the 
independence concept to some executive branch officials. 
Defining "cause," of course, presents a problem. Congress has sev-
eral options in defining the for-cause requirement: it could use the for-
cause removal formula provided in Humphrey's Executor ("inefficiency," 
"neglect of duty," and "malfeasance"), devise one with greater detail, or 
transfer the removal standards Congress imposed on itself in the 1921 
Act to the new executive removal provision.126 It is unlikely that adding 
grounds for removal would bolster congressional control over the execu-
tive so as to raise separation-of-powers concerns. The real question 
would be, as Chief Justice Burger hinted in Bowsher, 127 whether the 
grounds for removal would include "maladministration" and thereby in-
vite a President to remove an executive official because of policy 
differences. 
Congress might be tempted to limit removal of executive officials to 
enumerated causes other than maladministration. If Congress did so, it 
might in effect be narrowing the existing "neglect of duty" and "malfea-
sance" language, which could encompass maladministration as well as 
the grounds for removal stated in the impeachment clause. In choosing 
that course, it would tie the President's hands in a rp.anner that would 
124. At least two legislative proposals are now circulating in Congress. One would give the 
budget-cutting power to a purely executive office, OMB. That option, although suspect politically, 
would be acceptable constitutionally since the Budget Director is an executive official. Alternatively, 
the Comptroller General could be reinstated into the process if Congress would cut its removal ties. 
This appears to be more difficult owing to the fact that the Comptroller performs many purely 
congressional functions. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at D2, col. 2. 
125. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1400-02 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), a.ff'd sub nom. 
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). 
126. This would add two additional grounds for removal to Humphrey's Executor's three: "per-
manent disability" and "a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude." 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(l) 
(1982). 
127. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3190. 
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limit his control over executive policymaking under article II. Congres-
sionally imposed executive removal constraints cannot jeopardize the 
President's ability to function without violating the separation-of-powers 
principles articulated in Bowsher. The legitimacy of maladministration 
removal remains an unresolved question. 
Second, whatever cause requirement Congress adopts, it also should 
explicitly provide for a hearing upon removal and for judicial review 
thereof. Present law implies these elements and there would be no harm 
in making them explicit. The advantage of such a provision would be to 
put the executive branch on notice that any contested removal could be 
achieved only after a clear expression and testing of the President's mo-
tives for removal. To some degree this would moderate the executive 
exercise of maladministration removal. 
Third, Congress should retain its participation in the appointment 
of the Comptroller General. Surprisingly, the appointment provision 
went unchallenged in Bowsher. This provision 128 requires the President 
to nominate the Comptroller General from a list of three individuals pro-
vided by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President 
Pro Tempore of the Senate. This restriction on the President's appoint-
ment power might be thought to raise some constitutional questions in 
light of the clear statements expressed in Buckley v. Valeo. 129 But it went 
unchallenged in Bowsher, and the Court might continue to view the pro-
vision, like the for-cause removal requirement, as a limited restriction 
that does not jeopardize the executive function under the Constitution. 
Fourth, Congress should provide the Comptroller General a single 
term of fifteen years. Appointment to terms that exceed the President's 
is not an unusual restraint; most agency commissioners now are ap-
pointed for terms of five or seven years. As a practical matter, a fifteen-
year term insulates the Comptroller from political influence. A lengthy 
term of appointment implies a "good behavior" standard130 and nothing 
in Bowsher restricts this congressional option. 
128. 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(2), (3) (1982). 
129. In all likelihood the list of three names would be submitted to the President after considern· 
ble discussion at which the Vice-President (as President Pro Tempore of the Senate) would be able to 
express the President's viewpoint. This kind of process may be in fact not much different than that 
which would obtain for political reasons in sensitive appointment situations even where no such 
requirement exists. 
130. Compare the analogous situation of judicial tenure. The framers of the Constitution 
thought preservation of judicial independence a policy important enough to support judicial tenure 
for good behavior. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ II, at 40 & n.2 (4th cd. 
1983) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 494-96 (Wright cd. 1961); and id. No. 79, at 487). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Bowsher v. Synar is a fascinating chapter in the Court's revived 
foray into separation-of-powers analysis. Like its methodological cousin, 
INS v. Chadha, it formulates a strict view on the limits of congressional 
authority to participate with the executive branch in policymaking. By 
restricting Congress to the explicit form of executive official removal con-
tained in the Constitution-the impeachment clause-it deprives Con-
gress of control over the behavior and perhaps the loyalty of officials 
performing executive functions. 
The open questions after Bowsher are far reaching: Does it portend 
the demise of all independent agencies? Does it suggest that Humphrey's 
Executor should be overruled or at least limited to nonexecutive func-
tions? The opinions in Bowsher provide guidance on these questions. 
Humphrey's Executor, for all its tortured reasoning and "quasi" analysis, 
emerges as a central precedent on the degree to which the Constitution 
will tolerate congressional interference with removal. The Court does 
not seem concerned with the for-cause removal restraints Congress 
places on removal of agency officials who exercise executive functions. 
Thus, independent agencies should be able to continue their existence as 
constitutional anomalies. 
The Comptroller General may also benefit from Bowsher's organiza-
tional framework. An option Congress might pursue is an "independ-
ent" Comptroller with a fifteen-year term. The revised position would 
have most of the characteristics of the previous one-except that it 
would not require the Comptroller to exercise executive power in an un-
constitutional fashion. 
While the logic of the direct challenges to independent agencies in 
cases such as Ticor is tempting to adopt because it breaks cleanly with 
the past, adherence to this kind of rigid separation-of-powers analysis 
would eliminate an organizational mechanism that has served both polit-
ical branches well for many years. Moreover, if the Court rejects a for-
cause removal requirement, it would also llave to consider rejecting a 
term-of-years appointment as well as the bipartisan-composition require-
ment. These restrictions have been working well for fifty years. While 
no guarantee of future acceptance, past success does indicate that modest 
constraints upon executive removal are functionally sound. Unless one 
wants to propose some absolute notion of executive control, these provi-
sions suggest that the independent agency has a useful and continuing 
life, which is just what the Bowsher Court implied when it resuscitated 
Humphrey's Executor. 
